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COMPENSATION OF THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY:
A REEXAMINATION

The compensation of the federal judiciary has been a persistent
issue since the enactment of the Judiciary Act of 1789.1 The problem
has been traditionally perceived in the context of particular proposals
for salary increases,2 but the underlying issues are much more fundamental than the concerns of the day. The institutional arrangements by
which judicial compensation is determined and the factors which shape
that determination have a profound impact on the fiscal and human
resouces of the judiciary, on the power relationships among the three
branches of the national government, and, thereby, on the independence and quality of the judicial branch.
Though many analogous problems are shared by state judges, those
of the federal judiciary are of special concern. Its judges enjoy a
salient prestige, its courts are distributed geographically throughout
the country,3 and its relationship with Congress and the Executive
Branch is unique. While the states differ widely in their approaches
to judicial compensation, 4 these differences no doubt reflect variations
in local needs and priorities. The federal system itself, on the other
hand, establishes a dichotomy which sets federal courts and judges
apart from their state counterparts, implying separate consideration
of their requirements.
I

Stat. 73 (1789).
See, e.g., JUDICIAL AND CONGRESSIONAL SALARIES, H.R. REP. No. 49, 84th Cong., 1st
Sess. (1955); Hearingson H.R. 113, H.R. 1494, and H.R. 3886 Before Subcomm. No. 2 ofthe
House Comm. on the Judiciary, 82d Cong., 1st Sess., ser. 6 (1951); Hearings Before the
Comm. on Judicial and Congressional Salaries, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. (1954); REPORTS OF THE
TASK FORCES OF THE COMMISSION ON JUDICIAL AND CONGRESSIONAL SALARIES, S. Doc. No.
97, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. (1954); Hearings on S. 5, S. 1163, S. 1415, and S. 1663 Before a
Subcomm. of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 83d Cong., 1st Sess. (1953); American
Judicature Society, Judicial Salaries and Retirement Plans in the United States, 54 JUDICATURE 180 (1970); Dickerman, The Business of the Federal Courts, and the Salaries of the
Judges, 24 AM. L. REV. 78 (1890); Issac, The Reliefof FederalCourts and the Pay of Federal
Judges, 93 CENTRAL L.J. 255 (1921); Mitchell, The Judicial Salary Crisis, 39 A.B.A.J. 197
(1953); Mooney, FederalJudges Compensation-ProposedLegislation, 27 N.Y.U.L. REV.
457 (1952).
3 In 1974, there were 667 federal judges located in the fifty states, the District of Columbia, Canal Zone, Virgin Islands, Puerto Rico, and Guam. This does not include bankruptcy
judges and staff, which numbered 1056, or U.S. Magistrates and staff, which numbered 710.
Civil Filings Up, but Criminal Filings Down in Federal Courts, Administrative Office Report
Shows, 60 A.B.A.J. 1404, 1407 (1974).
4 There are differences in amount of annual salary; availability of local supplements to the
annual salary; benefits, including medical and life insurance, holidays, and vacation time;
expense reimbursement; retirement plans; procedure for salary increases; and constitutional
provisions concerning minimum and maximum salaries. See American Judicature Society,
Judicial Compensation 1974, 58 JUDICATURE 159, 168-206 (1974).
2
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This analysis, therefore, will first examine and criticize the present
system of compensation for federal judges. Next, an inquiry will be
made into the purposes and goals that a compensation scheme for the
federal judiciary should serve. Finally, a proposal for a new system of
compensation will be offered, which, it is hoped, is responsive to
presently perceived needs.
I.

THE PRESENT SYSTEM OF FEDERAL JUDICIAL
COMPENSATION

The patterns of increases of federal judicial salaries has been
marked by long, irregular intervals in which salary levels remained
constant.5 A span of less than six years between increases has occurred
only twice.' As of the beginning of 1975, the salary of federal judges
7
had not changed in six years.
5 The history of salaries of Supreme Court Associate Justices (with the Chief Justice
receiving an additional $500 each year until 1969, and an additional $2500 thereafter) is $3500,
1 Stat. 72 (1789); $4500, 3 Stat. 484 (1819); $6000, 10 Stat. 655 (1855); $8000, 16 Stat. 494
(1871); $10,000, 18 Stat. 108 (1874); $12,500, 32 Stat. 825 (1903); $14,500,36 Stat. 1152 (1911);
$20,000, 44 Stat. 919 (1926); $25,000, 60 Stat. 716 (1946); $35,000, 69 Stat. 9 (1955); $39,500,
78 Stat. 434 (1964); and $60,000, 83 Stat. 864 (1969).
The history of salaries of the judges of the Courts of Appeals since 1891, the year in which
the Courts of Appeals were established, is $6,000, 16 Stat. 494 (1871), 26 Stat. 826 (1891);
$7,000, 32 Stat. 825 (1903); $8,500, 40 Stat. 1157 (1919); $12,500, 44 Stat. 919 (1926); $17,500,
60 Stat. 716 (1946); $25,500, 69 Stat. 10 (1955); $33,000, 78 Stat. 434 (1964); and $42,500, 83
Stat. 864 (1969).
The history of the salaries of the judges of the district courts since 1891, the year in which
salaries were made uniform for all district judges, is $5,000, 26 Stat. 783 (1891); $6,000, 32
Stat. 825 (1903); $7,500,40Stat. 1156 (1919); $10,000,44 Stat. 919 (1926); $15,000, 60 Stat. 716
(1946); $22,500, 69 Stat. 10 (1955); $30,000, 78 Stat. 434 (1964); and $40,000, 83 Stat. 864
(1969).
In connection with the changing salaries it is relevant to note the history of the tax status of
federal judges. In Evans v. Gore, 253 U.S. 245 (1920), and Miles v. Graham, 268 U.S. 501
(1925), it was held that as a matter of constitutional law, based on U.S. Const. art. 3, § 1,
salaries of federal judges were not subject to federal income taxes. This rule was reversed,
however, in O'Malley v. Woodrough, 307 U.S. 277 (1939). In Baker v. Commissioner, 149
F.2d 342, 344 (4th Cir. 1945), cert. denied, 326 U.S. 746 (1945), it was held that "ajudge who
takes office under an established Congressional policy of taxing his salary becomes entitled
only to the salary prescribed by statute less income taxes ..
" Moreover, the court
emphasized that the constitutional provision against diminishing judicial salaries did not
apply to raising income tax rates. Consequently, since the policy of taxing federal judges'
salaries was established in the Revenue Act of 1918, 40 Stat. 1057 (1919), the only judges to
whom the doctrine of Evans v. Gore now has any application are those who entered the
federal judiciary before 1918. See also B. BITTKER & L. STONE, FEDERAL INCOME, ESTATE

AND GiFT TAXATION 180 (4th ed. 1972).

With respect to state and local taxation of federal judges' salaries, Congress consented to
such taxation in the Public Salary Act, 53 Stat. 574 (1939). Congress, may so consent in the
area of intergovernmental taxation. Graves v. New York ex rel. O'Keefe, 306 U.S. 466
(1939).
6 Supreme Court justices waited only three years between 1871 and 1874. All federal
judges' salaries were increased in 1964 and 1969, a five-year span.
' Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, $62,500; Associate Justices of the Supreme Court,
$60,000; Judges of the Courts of Appeals, $42,500; Judges of the District Courts, $40,000;
Judges of the Court of Claims, Court of Customs and Patent Appeals, Court of Military
Appeals, $42,500; Judges of the Customs Court and Tax Court, $40,000. 83 Stat. 864 (1969).
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Federal judges have attractive retirement benefits. After reaching
seventy years of age and having served at least ten years on the bench,
a judge may resign and continue to receive the same salary as he
received at his date of resignation.8 If a judge is age sixty-five with
fifteen years of service or seventy with ten years of service, he may
9
accept retired-judge status and have a reduced workload. He may
1
0
then continue to receive the regular salary of that office. In case of
disability while on the bench, a judge may retire and receive the full
salary of the office if he has served for ten years or longer, or 50 percent of his former salary if he has served less than ten years." Judges
have the additional opportunity to elect to subscribe to an annuity
his death,'1 2 varyplan which pays to the judge's survivors a sum upon
3
ing with his average salary and length of service.'
The Commission on Executive, Legislative, and Judicial Salaries,
which is charged with the duty of recommending the level of judicial
compensation, was established in 1967.'4 The Commission, composed
of nine appointed members, 15 is required to make its recommendations
to the President at four-year intervals.' 6 The law requires that the
President, in the budget next submitted by him after receipt of a report
of the Commission, set forth his recommendations with respect to the
s 28 U.S.C. § 371(a) (1970).
9 28 U.S.C. § 371(b) (1970).
10 Id.

I1 28 U.S.C. § 372(a) (1970).

28 U.S.C. §§ 375, 376 (1970), as amended, (Supp. II, 1972).
Length of service includes all governmental service, whether judicial or not. 28 U.S.C.
§ 376(c) (1970), as amended, (Supp. II, 1972). In addition to the annuities, other fringe
benefits are available. Judges are covered by government health programs and share the cost
of the premiums with the government. Vacations may extend to one month; holidays
generally correspond to those observed in the place where the court sits. Judges are also
reimbursed for official travel. See American Judicature Society, supra note 4, at 194.
14 2 U.S.C. § 351 et seq. (1970).
15 Appointees include
(a) three appointed by the President of the United States, one of whom shall be
designated as Chairman by the President; (b) two appointed by the President of
the Senate; (c) two appointed by the Speaker of the House of Representatives;
and (d) two appointed by the Chief Justice of the United States.
2 U.S.C. § 352(1) (1970).
16Id. § 352(3); 2 U.S.C. § 357 (1970).
A variety of executive, legislative, and judicial positions are subject to the Commission's
scrutiny. Included are (A) Senators, Members of the House of Representatives, and the Resident
Commissioner from Puerto Rico; (B) offices and positions in the legislative
branch referred to in sections 136a and 136a-1 of this title, sections 42a and 51a
of Title 31, sections 162a and 162b of Title 40, and section 39a of Title 44; (C)
justices, judges, and other personnel in the judicial branch referred to in
sections 402(d) and 403 of the Federal Judicial Salary Act of 1964; (D) offices
and positions under the Executive Schedule in Subchapter II of Chapter 53 of
Title 5; and (E) the Governors of the Board of Governors of the United States
Postal Service appointed under section 202 of Title 39.
2 U.S.C. § 356 (1970).
12
13

SPRING

1975]

Compensation of the Federal Judiciary

levels of compensation. 7 The President's recommendations become
effective thirty days following transmittal of the budget, unless in the
meantime:
(A) there has not been enacted into law a statute which establishes rates of pay other than those proposed by all or part of
such recommendations, [or] (B) neither House of the Congress
has enacted legislation which specifically disapproves all or part
18
of such recommendations.
II.

OBJECTIONS TO THE PRESENT SCHEME

The present scheme of compensation is objectionable from the
point of view of judges,1" of the judiciary as a whole,20 and of a society
interested in diffusion of power within the national government. 21 The
objections chiefly put forth are that the present system results in
inadequate salaries, 2 that salary distribution within the federal
judiciary is inequitable,23 and that the system encroaches upon the
independence of the federal judiciary. 24 Additionally, judicial resources are inefficiently expended in lobbying efforts. 25 The ultimate
danger is a decline in the quality of the judiciary.
A. Inadequacy of Salaries
With increasing frequency since the end of World War II, federal
judges have said that they can not live adequately on their official
salaries. 26 The judges' complaints tend to emphasize that their salaries
cause uncertainty about their ability to provide adequately for their
children's education and to accumulate savings for the support of their

2 U.S.C. § 358 (1970).
18 2 U.S.C. § 359 (1970).
19 The expressions ofjudicial discontent with the present system are plentiful. See, e.g.,
Chapin, The Judicial Vanishing Act, 58 JUDICATURE 160 (1974) (includes interviews with
former federal judges).
20 Id.; See also Remarks of Chief Justice Warren E. Burger, in ANNUAL REPORT ON THE
17

STATE OF THE JUDICIARY, AMERICAN BAR AssOCIATION MID-WINTER MEETING, CHICAGO,

ILLINOIS, Feb. 23, 1975, at 8-9.
21 Wall Street J., Jan. 31, 1975, at 8, col. 1.
22 See notes 26-38 and accompanying text infra.
23 See notes 39-44 and accompanying text infra.
24 See notes 45-51 and accompanying text infra.
25 See note 88 and accompanying text infra.
26 See HearingsBefore the Comm. on Judicial and Congressional Salaries, supra note 2,

at 63 (statement of Evan Howell, former judge of the Court of Claims); Id. at 241-52
(statement of Harold M. Kennedy, former United States District Court Judge). See also
Chapin, supra note 19, at 161-62 (statements of former district judges Anthony T. Augelli,
David L. Middlebrooks, and Arrold Bauman).
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families after their deaths.2 7 In view of the fact that the median income of American families in 1972 was $11,116,28 one might question
a claim that a person can not adequately live on $40,000 per year, the
present salary of a federal district court judge. There are, however,
special circumstances involving compensation of a federal judge that
make such a suggestion plausible. It is inconsistent with proper judicial
behavior for a judge to make productive use of his official income in
large scale investments.29 Such a restraint is derived from the assumption, which has not always been followed by individual judges, 30 that
judges should be impartial and independent of extraneous economic
influence. Today, these restraints on extrajudicial conduct have been
formalized and forcefully expressed in the Code of Judicial Conduct.
The most specific canons on the subject are 5C(1):
A judge should refrain from financial and business dealings that
tend to reflect adversely on his impartiality, interfere with the
proper performance of his judicial duties, exploit his judicial
position, or involve him in frequent transactions with lawyers or
persons likely to come before the court on which he serves.
and 5C(3):
A judge should manage his investments and other financial interests to minimize the number of cases in which he is disqualified.
As soon as he can do so without serious financial detriment, he
should divest himself of investments and other financial interests
31
that might require frequent disqualification.
27 See, e.g., the statement of Harold M. Kennedy, former iUnited States District Judge, at
the 1953 Senate Hearings on judicial salaries:
[W]hen I resigned I had nothing to say about the reason for my resignation; I did
not think it was appropriate. But now maybe is the time to say it ....
I do not
keep a maid; I never did, and I do not have a car and never did. My household
expenses ran to about $700 a month. By the time that I got through I had
absolutely no way of getting any security for my wife; she is younger than I. I
had no means of paying for an annuity for her. I had some insurance, but I had
no private capital and no outside income.
Hearings on S. 5, S. 1163, S. 1415, and S. 1663, supra note 2, at 54-55.
See also Chapin, supra note 19, at 161-62.
28 U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES, 1974 at
385 (1974).
29 ABA CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT, CANONS 5, 6.
10 For a discussion of extreme examples of judges who violated their duties of independence and impartiality beyond the point of mere conflict of interest, see J. BORKIN, THE
CORRUPT JUDGE (1962). Borkin's study concentrates on the judicial misconduct of three
judges. Other examples include judges who have been impeached and removed from office.
See Swindler, High Court of Congress:Impeachment Trials, 1797-1936,60 A. B.A.J. 420,427
(1974).
3 1 The Commentary to Canon 5C is explicit about whether financial security or objectivity
should take precedence if the two conflict:
Canon 5 may cause temporary hardship in jurisdictions where judicial
salaries are inadequate and judges are presently supplementing their income
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Furthermore, the adequacy of judicial compensation may reflect the
fact that most federal judges have the alternative of practicing law at
a higher salary. 32 This problem is not new.33 A contemporary example
is that of Arnold Bauman, a former judge in the Southern District of
New York, who left the bench for a $150,000-per-year position with
a New York law firm. 34 From the perspective of a federal judge, a
judicial salary is likely to represent a significant financial sacrifice.
In addition, a federal judge may regard his salary as inadequate in
comparison to salaries of some state judges. In twenty states, some of

through commercial activities. The remedy, however, is to secure adequate
judicial salaries.
Canon 6 emphasizes that public disclosure of compensation should be the rule forjudges: "A
judge should regularly file reports of compensation received for quasi-judicial and extrajudicial activities." And though judges may hold and manage investments, subject to the
previous qualifications, Canon 5C(2) states that a judge "[s]hould not serve as an officer,
director, manager, advisor, or employee of any business."
32 The survey reported at 60 A.B.A.J. 123 (1974), indicates that the median total compensation of heads of corporate law departments is $57,000. Former Judge David L. Middlebrooks of the Northern District of Florida, who resigned August 1, 1974, to enter private
practice, suggests that people with sufficient competence to be federal judges could earn
$60,000 to $100,000 a year practicing law. Chapin, supra note 19, at 161.
'3 John Marshall was faced with this financial consideration:
Marshall's salary as Chief Justice was $500 more than that paid to the other
Justices. He received $4,000 a year when he was first appointed, and that was
increased to $5,000 in 1819. This, of course, was far below the potential
available to him if he had remained a lawyer in private practice and indicates
why he felt compelled to write the Washington biography and also why he
speculated so much in land development.
L. BAKER, JOHN MARSHALL: A LIFE IN LAW 558 (1974). As to the American judiciary in
general between 1776 and 1847:
A prominent. lawyer usually took a cut in income if he became a judge. The
salaries of judges, as of public officials in general, were not generous. Judges
continually complained that they were pinched for money. By statute in 1827,
New Jersey fixed the salary of the justices of the state supreme court at $1,000.
The chief justice earned $1,200. The governor earned $2,000. Lemuel Shaw
became chiefjustice of Massachusetts in 1830 at a salary of $3,000. The salary
was the source of his only reluctance. For trial judges, the fee system was
common. A New York law of 1786 awarded fees to the "judge of the court of
probates, . . . to wit: For filing every petition, one shilling; for making and
entering every order, six shillings; for every citation, under seal, to witnesses,
or for any other purposes, six shillings . . . for copies of all records and
proceedings, when required, for each sheet consisting of one hundred and
twenty-eight words, one shilling and six pence." Under the fee system, lowercourt judges sometimes got rich. But higher levels of the bench paid off in the
coin of high status.
L. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW 121 (1973) (footnotes omitted).
Another well-known historical figure is Associate Supreme Court Justice Benjamin R.
Curtis who resigned from the bench in 1857 because he considered his $6,000 per year salary
to be inadequate. Mr. Justice Curtis then practiced law for seventeen years until his death.
During that time, he had an average annual income of slightly over $38,000 per year.
Dickerman, supra note 2, at 85.
" N.Y. Times, June 9, 1974, at 5, col. 1. Other examples include former Judge Middlebrooks of the Northern District of Florida, who is now making at least $60,000 a year working
fora Pensacola law firm. Chapin, supra note 19, at 161-62. Sidney 0. Smith, former District
Judge for the Northern District of Georgia, "would have turned down a $120,000 partnership
offer if even a 25 percent salary hike had come through." Time, Feb. 10, 1975, at 74.
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the state judges are paid as much as or more than federal district
judges.3 5 In New York, the most extreme example, judges of the
Family Court in New York City are paid a greater salary than federal
district judges.3 6 This appears to be somewhat anomalous and would be
especially so to a federal judge 37 if the proposition is taken seriously
that a higher status, responsibility, and popularity inhere in the federal
bench 38 and that such factors warrant a higher salary. On the other
hand, status may be part of the federal judges' compensation, albeit
an intangible one.
B. Inequities
A second objection to the present federal judicial compensation
scheme is directed at its inequity. Judges are paid identical salaries for
assuming roughly equal responsibility and doing similar work, but
they work and live in very different places subject to a wide range of
living costs. One measure of these costs is the Consumer Price Index
for various regions of the country. For example, the annual average
of the Consumer Price Index for 197331 was 145.5 for the Philadelphia
area and 127.5 for the Seattle area, a difference of 18.0.40 Another
inequitable aspect of the present uniform system is that the relative
35 These states include Alaska, California, Connecticut, Delaware, Florida, Georgia,
Illinois, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, New Jersey, Ohio, Pennsylvania,
New York, South Carolina, Tennessee, Texas, Virginia, and Wisconsin. American Judicature Society, supra note 4, at 168-93 (1974).
36 Judges of the Family Court in New York City make $42,451 per year, as do judges of the
New York City Civil Court and the New York City Criminal Court. Id. at 183, 184.
" See Time, Feb. 10, 1975, at 74.
38 Judge Friendly has suggested that the reasons for the high status and popularity of the
lower federal courts
may be due in part to their rather low visibility ....
Yet I think the impression
is rather general that, with the exceptions inevitable for an institution that has
endured for so many generations... , they have largely fulfilled Hamilton's
expectations that "Ulustice through them may be administered with ease and
dispatch" and that, owing their "official existence to the union," they "will
never be likely to feel any bias inauspicious to the principles on which it is
founded."
H. FRIENDLY, FEDERAL JURISDICTION: A GENERAL VIEW 2-3 (1973) (footnotes omitted).
39 U.S. DEPT OF LABOR, MONTHLY LABOR REVIEW, Nov. 1974, at 108.
The Consumer Price Index is a monthly statistical measure of the average
change in prices of goods and services purchased by urban wage earners and
clerical workers for day-to-day living. It is based on prices of about 400
"market-basket" items selected to represent all consumption goods and services purchased by these workers.
Id. at 100.
Price indexes are given in relation to the base period of 1967= 100. Id. at 100. It is also
possible to use the "City Worker's Family Budget," published annually by the Bureau of
Labor Statistics of the United States Department of Labor, which covers thirty-nine areas in
the United States and compares the budgets of three groups of families according to the level
of their expenditure. Cost-of-living figures compiled by the states are also available.
40 The areas listed include not only the central city but the entire urban portion of the
Standard Metropolitan Statistical Areas, as defined for the 1960 Census of Population. Id. at
108.
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status of federal judges may vary according to their locality. This
phenomenon results from the fact that in some states federal judgeships are financially more attractive than a comparable position with
the state judiciary, while in other states, the opposite is true. The
extremes of the state salary differential are in the states of New York
and Utah: the average salary of a New York state judge is roughly
2.63 percent greater than that of his counterpart in Utah.4 Depending
on the position within this wide range, the federal judiciary is either a
more or less attractive alternative to state judicial service.
Moreover, the Commission on Executive, Legislative, and Judicial
Salaries works to the disadvantage of the federal judges and the federal
judiciary. Of all the positions subject to the Commission's jurisdiction,
the federal judges are the only group so widely distributed throughout
the country. 42 Thus, salary needs of the judges differ from the needs of
Congressmen and certain executive personnel. Yet, because the Commission must always review together the salaries of the five statutory
groups under its jurisdiction, 43 including "the relationships between
and among the respective offices and positions covered by such review,"44 salary increases for judges tend to be considered only in
conjunction with those for the other groups.
C. Encroachment on Judicial Independence
Because the establishment of judges' salaries is a product of the
interrelation of a public commission, the President, and the Congress,
the judiciary is vulnerable to institutional conflict. Such conflict can
threaten its independence vis-4-vis the other branches. This development is unfortunate because the concept of judicial independence,
though difficult to define, goes to the very heart of the American system of government. It is a common assumption that independence is
a necessary condition for an effective judiciary.4 5 An illustration of the
effect of the present method of salary determination will demonstrate
its detrimental impact on judicial independence.
The law establishing the Commission on Executive, Legislative, and
Judicial Salaries was approved on December 16, 1967.46 The ComAmerican Judicature Society, supra note 4, at 183, 190.
Except for some of the positions under level IV, 5 U.S.C.A. § 5315 (1967), as amended
(Supp. 1975), and level V, 5 U.S.C.A. § 5316 (1967), as amended (Supp. 1975), most of the
offices subject to the Commission's jurisdiction are centered in the Washington, D.C., area.
See note 16 supra.
43 2 U.S.C. § 356 (1970).
44 2 U.S.C. § 356(i) (1970).
45 D. MINAR, IDEAS AND POLITICS: THE AMERICAN EXPERIENCE 128 (1964).
46 81 Stat. 642 (1967).
42
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mission's first report was not submitted to the President until
December, 1968, and the President submitted his recommendations
to the Congress on January 15, 1969. 47 Since the Commission is
required to make its recommendations at four-year intervals, 48 the
next Commission should have formulated its proposals in 1972 and
4
made its recommendations to the President in December of that year. 1
However, President Nixon failed to appoint the Commission on time. 50
The recommendations were finally offered in 1974, an election year
for Congress but not for the President. Accordingly, Congress rejected
the proposals for a three-step pay increase.5 The losers of this political
battle were the federal judges, who received little attention and no
salary raise.
D. Decline in Quality of the Federal Judiciary
It has been frequently suggested that there has been and will be
difficulty in attracting qualified people to the federal bench.52 Inadequate and inequitable salaries may induce judges to leave the Bench
and discourage qualified candidates from seeking judgeships. To the
extent that the Judiciary responds by becoming less independent and
attempting to court either the Congress or the Executive, its status
may decline.5 3 Of more serious consequence, its objectivity in the face
83 Stat. 863 (1969).
2 U.S.C. §§ 352(3), 357 (1970).
49 2 U.S.C. § 352(2) (1970) seems to have contemplated that the first Commission was to be
appointed in the 1969 fiscal year and was to make its recommendations in time for the
January, 1969 budget. The next Commission was to have been appointed in the "fourth fiscal
year following the 1969 fiscal year." Id. § 352(3). That would have meant the 1973 fiscal year
in order for the recommendations to be available in time for the January 1973 budget.
President Nixon did not appoint the Commission until the 1974 fiscal year, and his recommendations to the Congress were made in January, 1974.
50 Senator Gale McGee, Chairman of the Senate Committee on Post Office and Civil
Service, which initially receives the President's salary recommendations, has also stated,
President Nixon appointed his quadrennial commission too late for it to
include a review and to formulate a report to the president so that the question
could be taken up in 1973, a non-election year, as intended.
McGee, Are Judicial Salary Increases Coming? 60 A.B.A.J. 1259 (1974).
51 McGee, supra note 50, at 1259.
51 See Mooney, supra note 2, at 457. REPORTS OF THE TASK FORCE OF THE COMMISSION ON
JUDICIAL AND CONGRESSIONAL SALARIES, supra note 2, at 56; N.Y. Times, Oct. 10, 1973, at
46, col. 4 (letter from Prof. Maurice Rosenberg). Chief Justice Burger has recently said that
[the federal judiciary has] had more resignations in the past year, based on
economic grounds, than at any time in the past one hundred years. I am also
reliably informed that many qualified lawyers have declined appointment because the pay of a district judge is now only double the starting salary of law
graduates hired by large law offices. It is surely not in the public interest to have
some of the best qualified lawyers resigning or declining appointments because
of inequitable and inadequate compensation.
McGee, supra note 50, at 1260.
53 It has usually been thought that the threat to status of federal judges comes from the
increasing number of federal judges and the broadening scope of their duties. H. FRIENDLY,
47
48
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of issues of political import may also be impaired.54 Some indirect
evidence indicates that the first of these results is already occurring.
Since the end of World War II, a number of respected federal judges
have resigned; within the last year alone, seven federal judges have
resigned, at least five of whom did so partly for salary reasons. 55
III.

REFORM IN JUDICIAL COMPENSATION METHODS

A. The HistoricalRole of Compensation
Suggestions for reform of the present system invite an examination
of historical principles. A starting point is the debate at the Constitutional Convention on the judicial compensation provision of the
Constitution.5 6 The debate centered on the relative merits of the provision finally adopted, "The Judges

. .

. shall, at stated Times, receive

for their Services a Compensation which shall not be diminshed during
their Continuance in Office, '57 and a proposal that "[n]o increase, or
supra note 38, at 2-3; Carrington, Book Review, 72 MICH. L. REV. 628, 630 (1974). A
dependent and conformist judiciary would also find its status diminished.
54 With respect to the major first amendment issues,
the courts must play a crucial part in maintaining and extending our system of
freedom of expression. Their competence to do so rests upon their independence from the other branches of government, their relative immunity to
immediate political and popular pressures, the training and quality of their
personnel, their utilization of legal procedures, and their powers of judicial
review. The need of the courts to perform this function has become more
imperative as the nation has moved from nineteenth-century economic
liberalism to twentieth-century mass democracy.
T. EMERSON, THE SYSTEM OF FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION 13 (1970).
55Between 1940 and 1954 eighteen federal judges resigned. HEARINGS BEFORETHE COMM.
ON JUDICIAL AND CONGRESSIONAL SALARIES, supra note 2, at 45 1. Within the last year alone
the following federal judges resigned: Judge Thomas A. Masterson of Philadelphia; Judge
Sidney 0. Smith of Atlanta; Judge David L. Middlebrooks of Tallahassee; Judge Arnold
Bauman of New York City; Judge Anthony J. Travia of Brooklyn; Judge Hiram Cancio of
San Juan; and Judge Anthony T. Augelli of Newark. Letter from Joseph F. Spaniol,
Executive Assistant to the Director of the Administrative Office of the United States Courts,
to the author, October 21, 1974 (on file at the University of MichiganJournalofLaw Reform);
Chapin, supra note 19, at 161; Time, Feb. 10, 1975, at 74.
56 U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1.
57 Id. Litigation giving meaning to art. III § 1 has been sparse. The basic questions
presented by this provision have concerned which judges are protected by the provision and
whether income taxes "diminish" ajudge's salary. In Charles v. United States, 21 F. Supp.
366 (Ct. Cl. 1937), it was held that the provision only applies to judges of a constitutional
court. In that case, it was decided that the income of a referee in bankruptcy arising out of
fees paid to him for services in that capacity is subject to an income tax, since a referee is not a
"judge" whose compensation may not be diminished. In O'Donoghue v. United States, 289
U.S. 516 (1933), it was held that the Supreme Court and Court of Appeals of the District of
Columbia were constitutional courts, the judges of which could not have their salary constitutionally diminished.
In Booth v. United States, 291 U.S. 339 (1934), the Supreme Court held that this provision
prohibits reduction of compensation of retired federal judges below the amount fixed at date
of retirement, even if the reduced compensation exceeds the judge's salary when he first took
office.
The status of the income tax under this provision has already been discussed in note 5
supra.
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diminution shall be made so as to affect the persons actually in office
at the time of such increase or diminution." 58 James Madison, a supporter of the latter proposal, argued that the compensation provision
must not undermine the basic goals of the judicial branch. 59 The proposal, he asserted, would ensure: (1) the impartiality of judges and
the ability of the judges to carry out their duties objectively; (2) the
independence of judges individually, and the judiciary, generally; and
(3) the quality of the federal judiciary and its ability to attract qualified
people. 60
The supporters6' of the provision eventually adopted did not disagree with Madison's view of the goals of the judicial branch or the
role of compensation in furthering these goals. They simply felt that
allowing legislative increases of judicial salary "would not create any
improper dependence in the Judges." 62
[They] urged that, as money became more plentiful, manners and
style of living altered, the country more populous, and the business of the Courts increasing, [the judges'] salaries ought to be
63
susceptible of increase.
Similar views about the role of compensation schemes were expressed by Alexander Hamilton in the Federalist Papers. He
emphasized the connection between compensation and the goal of
independence for judges and the judiciary:
Next to permanency in office, nothing can contribute more to the
independence of the judges than a fixed provision for their support .... And we can never hope to see realized in practice the
complete separation of the judicial from the legislative power,
in any system which leaves the former dependent for pecuniary
resources on the occasional grants of the latter.6 4
Hamilton felt that because of inflation, a fixed-sum approach would
58 C. WARREN, THE MAKING OF THE CONSTITUTION 533
59 Id.

(1937).

Id.
The supporters of what is now art. III, § 1,included Gouverneur Morris and Benjamin
Franklin. Id.
62 Id.
63 Id. Hart and Wechsler write:
What chiefly stirred debate was the proposal to prevent the temptation of
increases. After first being accepted in the Committee of the Whole, it was
rejected in the general debate in the Convention and again in the debate on the
report of the Committee of Detail. But the rejection was largely on the practical
ground that the cost of living might rise, and it prevailed only over the strong
opposition of Madison and the votes of Virginia and North Carolina.
H. HART & H. WESCHSLER, THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 7 (2d ed. 1973)
(footnotes omitted). See also I M. FARRAND,THE RECORDSOFTHE FEDERAL CONVENTION 121
(1911) and 2 id. 44-45, 429-30.
64 THE FEDERALIST No. 79, at 472 (C. Rossiter ed. 1961) (A. Hamilton).
60

61
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not be adequate and that the legislature would have to be relied on to
authorize increases. However, to minimize the possible encroachment
on the judiciary by the legislature, the constitutional provision prohibiting decreases in salary for sitting federal judges was necessary.65
As chairman of the Massachusetts Judicial Salary Committee in
1806,66 Joseph Story addressed himself to the role of judicial compensation schemes:
Domestic concerns, and, much more, the active pursuit of property, are, in a great degree, inconsistent with [judges'] duties; and,
as they are thus shut out from the acquisition of wealth, it would
seem to be the proper office of the legislature to become the
guardians of their families. . . .'
An acceptable scheme of compensation, he noted, must guarantee
impartiality and the appearance of impartiality among judges, attract
qualified people, further the independence of judges, and support the
"permanent respectability of the judiciary. 66
Modern commentators have not added significantly to these early
analyses.6 9 Recent writing on the subject has come during periods of
agitation for salary increases. 70 The commentators include groups such
as the American Bar Association 7' and the American Judicature
Society, 72 which have been involved in some organized lobbying for
salary increases. These modern views echo the concern that judicial
compensation can affect the independence and the quality of the
judiciary. 73 Yet, the goals of compensation schemes and the schemes
themselves must be brought up to date to reflect the realities of American society in the last quarter of the twentieth century.
at 473. U.S. CONsT. art. III, § 1.
66 Story was head of a committee created by the Massachusetts House of Representatives
to determine if the salaries of the judges of the Supreme Judicial Court should be increased.
The committee recommended doubling the salary of the judges. J. STORY, THE MISCELLANEOUS WRITINGS OF JOSEPH STORY 58, 61 (W. Story ed. 1852).
67 Id. at 61.
66 Id. at 60.
69Much of the discussion on this subject may be found in the Congressional hearings and
bar journals. See the references cited in note 2 supra.
70 See, e.g., Dickerman, supra note 2; Isaac, supra note 2; Mooney, supra note 2;
Mitchell, supra note 2; American Judicature Society, supra note 2.
7,The ABA has a standing Committee on Selection, Tenure, and Compensation, which
has actively lobbied for judicial salary increases.
72 For over twenty-five years, the American Judicature Society has devoted at least part of
one issue annually to the subject of judicial compensation.
73 For example:
[The] most compelling reason for granting these federal judicial salaries increases ... is the long and widely recognized need for such increases, in order
to preserve the standing and capacity of this important co-ordinate branch of
the federal government.
Mitchell, iupra note 2, at 200.
65 Id.
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B. Institutional Independence and Compensation
The basic concept that must be re-examined is judicial independence. The primary meaning attached to "judicial independence" has
been the independence of judges to make decisions free of improper
external pressures."4 This meaning of judicial independence was implicit in Madison's argument for judicial salaries fixed independently
of the Congress:
Whenever an increase is wished by the Judges or may be in agitation in the Legislature, an undue complaisance in the former
may be felt towards the latter. If, at such a crisis, there should
be in Court suits to which leading members of the Legislature
may be parties, the Judges will be in a situation which ought not
to be suffered if it can be prevented.7"
Perhaps the best description of this individualized sense of judicial
independence was given by Chief Justice John Marshall:
The Judicial Department comes home in its effects to every man's
fireside; it passes on his property, his reputation, his life, his all.
Is it not, to the last degree important, that [the Judge] should be
rendered perfectly and completely independent, with nothing
to influence or control him but God and his conscience? . . . I
have always thought . . . that the greatest scourge an angry
Heaven ever inflicted upon an ungrateful and a sinning people,
70
was an ignorant, a corrupt, or a dependent Judiciary.
The focus, then, has historically been on the independence of individual judges to render decisions rather than on the independence of
the judiciary as an entity. As long as adequate provision was made to
protect the integrity of each judge from financial temptation, the
judiciary seemed secure.7 7 It has been suggested that this individualized
concept of judicial independence is still dominant among federal
judges today. 78 But the vitality of this type of judicial independence is

11P.

FISH, THE POLITICSOF FEDERAL JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATION 427 (1973).
75 C. WARREN, supra note 58, at 533.
76 Speech by Chief Justice John Marshall during the debates of the Virginia State Convention of 1829-1830, quoted in O'Donoghue v. United States, 289 U.S. 516, 532 (1932).
7 In O'Donoghue the Court said:
In framing the Constitution, therefore, the power to diminish the compensation
of the federal judges was explicitly denied, in order, inter alia, that their
judgment or action might never be swayed in the slightest degree by the
temptation to cultivate the favor or avoid the displeasure of that department
which, as master of the purse, would otherwise hold the power to reduce their
means of support.
289 U.S. at 531.
78 P. FISH, supra note 74, at 427. See also Hearings on the Independence of Federal Judges
Before a Subcomm. of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. (1970).
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dependent upon the degree of institutional judicial independence. 79
The institutional sense of judicial independence is concerned with the
judiciary as a national institution in its relationship with other national
institutions.8" Professor Peter G. Fish has argued that the independence
of the judiciary as an institution may be secured only by the effective
functioning of a centralized judicial administrative apparatus: 81
Centralized judicial administration surely poses dangers, but it
raises a dilemma as well. Without at least some degree of central
control and clearance, the viability of the judiciary as an independent branch may be threatened by local and individual customs and behavior....
Administrative institutions and politics are, after all, but
means to an end; they are generally not ends in themselves. They
give life to the separation of powers doctrine in that the judgedeveloped administrative system enables courts to adjust to
changes in their legal, political, and economic environment
82
without surrendering judicial independence.
In short, the Judiciary must be organized in such a way to be able
to deal effectively with challenges thrown its way by the Executive
and Legislative branches as well as local pressures. If the centralized
judicial administration functions effectively, individual judges may
function in an environment relatively free from external pressures.
The federal judiciary has attempted to accomplish an effective centralization of administration through organizations such as the Judicial
Conference 3 (the national policy making organ), the Administrative
Office of the Courts84 (the judicial bureaucracy), and the Federal
Judicial Center 5 (the research-and-development organ). These groups
deal with congressional committees and with the federal bureaucracy
in an attempt to allow the judiciary "to function as a coordinate
86
part of the national political system.
But the Judiciary can not assure its independence merely by interposing an administrative institutional framework to deal with corresponding institutions in the Legislative and Executive branches.
Despite administrative centralization, Madison's view that any legislative involvement in judicial compensation schemes would inevitably
79 P. FISH, supra note 74, at 434; Address by Justice William J. Brennan, Jr., The
Continuing Education of the Judiciary in Improved Procedures, Tenth Circuit Judicial
Conference, July 5, 1960, at 8.
80 P. FisH, supra note 74, at 436.
81 Id.

82 Id. at 436-37.
83 Id. at 228-68.

Id..at 166-227.
85Id. at 340-78.
86 Id. at 437.
84

Journal of Law Reform

[VOL. 8:594

allow the legislature to encroach upon the judiciary remains relevant.17
The judiciary, through its major administrative organizations, must
expend time, money, and effort convincing the other branches of the
necessity of salary increases.88 Through these organizations, the
judiciary will inevitably attempt to impress individuals, committees, or
organizations in Congress or the Executive Branch. In the long run,
this process may increase the dependence of these organizations on the
other branches of government, thereby compromising, in turn, the
independence of the judiciary."9
IV. A PROPOSAL FOR REFORM
A reform of the present system would provide for automatic annual
salary increases based on percentage increases in the cost of living90 in
the -geographic area where the judge holds court. 91 Before the automatic
87 See notes 59-61 and accompanying text supra.

" Fish has described the Judicial Conference's staff work, which includes preparing
memoranda in support of bills proposed by the Conference:
"We put in one eighteen-hour stretch," related Judge Stephens, "myself,
Biggs, three secretaries, and a law clerk, from 9:30 in the morning until 12:30 at
night, to get the statutes and memorandum drafted in time for a deadline for
their presentation to Senator McCarran [chairman of the Senate Judiciary
Committee] and Congressman Cellar [chairman of the House Judiciary Committee]."
Some memoranda were exhaustively detailed. One to accompany ajudicial
salary bill considered "the nature and importance of the work of the Federal
bench, the history of Federal judicial salaries, a comparison of such salaries
with those of other court systems, including the English, . . . the relation of the
cost of living to salaries and of taxation on a reduction of salaries."
P. FISH, supra note 74, at 318. See also id. at 322-23, 334-37.
8" What occurs is a commingling of elites representing separate governmental institutions.
What results is a pool of interests independent of those institutions.
When the individual has become associated with a cooperative enterprise
[organization] he has accepted a position of contact with others similarly
associated. From this contact there must arise interactions between these
persons individually, and these interactions are social ....
They . . . cannot
be avoided ....
Such interactions are consequences of cooperation, and constitute one set of social factors involved in cooperation. These factors operate
on the individuals affected; and, in conjunction with other factors, become
incorporated in their mental and emotional characters.
C. BARNARD, THE FUNCTIONS OF THE EXECUTIVE 40-41 (1938), quoted in D. HAMPTON, C.
SUMMER & R. WEBBER, ORGANIZATION BEHAVIOR AND THE PRACTICE OF MANAGEMENT 19
(1968). When these contacts take place between individuals who represent different organizations there is the possibility that as a result of these interactions
organizational members and groups may [become] primarily interested in the
rational pursuit of their narrow interests and the consolidation and improvement of their own power position, even at the expense of wider organizational
interests.
N. MOUZELIS, ORGANIZATION AND BUREAUCRACY 159 (1967). This process has also been
described as "control among leaders" or "political bargaining." R. DAHL & C. LINDBLOM,
POLITICS, ECONOMICS, AND WELFARE

324-65 (1953).

90 The U.S. Consumer Price Index is one measure of the cost of living that may be used.
Other possible alternatives are described in note 39 supra.
91One method for determining the "area" where a judge holds court is to use the federal
judicial districts as the basic area unit. Judges of all the federal courts would be deemed to live
in the district which contains the court at which they sit most often.
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increases could be applied, salaries should be readjusted to reflect the
differences in the cost of living between judicial districts. A base salary
would be selected for the district with the lowest cost of living. The
initial salaries for the other districts would be greater than the base
salary by the percentage that the cost of living in those districts exceeds
that of the least expensive district.9 2 Then, in subsequent years, the
automatic increases would be effected. If the cost of living were to
decrease, there might be constitutional obstacles, derived from the
3
prohibition against diminishing the salaries of existing federal judges,
to decreasing judicial salaries. To avoid these constitutional problems,
there should be no actual decreases in salaries, but the percentage
decreases in the cost of living should be set off against subsequent
increases.
This proposal has been modeled after a number of contemporary
examples. At least four states have recently enacted automatic cost-ofliving salary provisions for their judiciary, based either on per capita
95
94
income or on the Consumer Price Index-California, Maryland,
Massachusetts,9" and Tennessee.97 The experiences of these states with
92 For example, if the Eastern District of Michigan had the lowest cost of living, the federal
district judges sitting in the Eastern District would receive the base salary of, for example,
$40,000, the present salary of federal districtjudges. If there are any Courts of Appeals judges
who sit most of the time in the Eastern District, they would receive a base salary of $42,500,
the present salary of judges of the Courts of Appeals. If the cost of living in the Southern
District of New York is 10 percent higher than that of the Eastern District of Michigan, the
district judges of the Southern District would receive $40,000 plus 10 percent of $40,000, or
$44,000.
93 U.S. CONsT. art. III, § I.
94 CAL. GOV'T. CODE ANN. § 68203 (Supp. 1974). The law provides for an annual automatic
increase based on the percentage increase in the California consumer price index as compiled
and reported by the California Department of Industrial Relations. The statute had originally
provided for an automatic increase every fourth year, based on the percentage increase in per
capita personal income in California as compiled by the U.S. Department of Commerce. Ch.
144, § 4, [1964] Cal. Stats., 1st Ex. Sess.
'5 MD. ANN. CODE art. 26, § 47(a), art. 64A, § 27 et seq. (1972). The Maryland system does
not provide much in the way of a new model for the Federal government. The Secretary of
Personnel prepares and recommends to the Governor a salary plan, which is subject to the
Governor's approval and the Legislature's provision of funds. Id. art. 64A, § 27(a). The
Secretary of Personnel has authority to make provisions for automatic increases. Id. art.
64A, § 30(a).
9' MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 30, § 46 (1973). The Massachusetts system also stops short
of the automatic increase. Whenever there is a 3 percent increase in the average cost of living,
the director of personnel and standardization must recommend legislation for a corresponding increase in the judge's salaries. The statute does not specify whether the average cost of
living is the average for the United States or for Massachusetts; the latter would seem to
make more economic sense. Apparently, the director may suggest legislation where there is
an increase of less than 3 percent, though he is not required to do so. He may also recommend
decreases if the average cost of living decreases, but no salary may be decreased below the
level of salary in effect on December 31, 1969.
97 3 TENN. CODE ANN. § 8-2303 (Supp. 1974). The Tennessee statute provides for automatic annual increases based on the percent increase in the average consumer price index (all
items-city average) as published by the U.S. Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor
Statistics, between the two calendar years preceding July of the year in which the adjust-
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the problems of accurate cost-of-living indexes and of decreases in the
cost of living should be useful sources of feedback for drafters of a
federal proposal. Kentucky has responded to the same economic concerns through judicial action. In a series of decisions beginning with
Matthews v. Allen,98 the Kentucky courts have interpreted constitutional provisions setting maximum salaries for judges99 as incorporating changes in the purchasing power of the dollar; accordingly, they
have held that the constitutional limitations on the maximum level to
which judicial salaries may be increased are subject to variations in
the cost of living. 10
The "post-adjustment" compensation system used by the United
Nations and World Bank,' who have staff members working in over
160 countries and territories, 0 2 provides an even more detailed model.
The purpose of designing the post-adjustment system was to establish
salary scales "adequate to recruit and retain staff"' 0 3 and "to
ensure that salaries have the same purchasing power in the various
areas of assignment.

' 10 4

The salaries are computed by taking into

account: (1) the difference in cost of living between a base city (New
York) at a base date and the city where the staff member works;1° 5 (2)
ment is made. Apparently, the relevant price index is the average for the entire United States,
not just for Tennessee. No reduction is made if the average consumer price index should
decrease. Tennessee's original statute had provided for annual increases based on the
percentage increase in the per capita personal income in the state between 1970 and the year
next preceding September 1 of the year for which the salaries are to be paid. Ch. 226, § 1
[1971] Tenn. Acts 631.
98 360 S.W.2d 135 (Ky, Ct. App. 1962).
99 Ky. CONST. § 246.
100 The Court in Matthews was confronted with a section of the state constitution which
provided a maximum salary limit for certain public officials. KY. CONST. § 246. Another
section of the constitution provided that judges of the circuit courts should receive "adequate
compensation." KY. CONST. § 133. Therefore, the court reasoned, to make these provisions
consistent, the fixed salary limit must be interpreted to take into account the declining
purchasing power of the dollar, thereby incorporating an automatic cost of living increase
into the limit. See also Commonwealth v. Hesch, 395 S.W.2d 362 (Ky. Ct. App. 1965); Meade
County v. Neafus, 395 S.W.2d 573 (Ky. Ct. App. 1965). In Meade County the court held that
the Matthews decision did not mean that salaries of public officials would be automatically
increased as the cost of living increased; Matthews merely gave the legislature authority to
raise the statutory maximum salary in accordance with the cost of living. 395 S.W.2d at 574.
In this connection, it has recently been suggested that, in violation of U.S. CONST. art. II,
§ 1, judges' salaries are being diminished by a failure to increase them as the cost of living
rises. See Time, Feb. 10, 1975, at 74.
101 The World Bank uses the United Nations post-adjustment salary system. Letter from
Fredrick Nossal, Information and Public Affairs of the World Bank, to the author, Oct. 18,
1974 (on file at the University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform).
102 Letter from Mohamed H. Gherab, Assistant Secretary-General, Personnel Services,
United Nations, to the author, Nov. 8, 1974 (on file at the University of MichiganJournalof
Law Reform).
103 3 REPORTOFTHE SPECIAL COMMITTEE FOR THE REVIEWOFTHE UNITED NATIONS SALARY
SYSTEM, Supp. No. 28 at 155, U.N. Doc. A/8728 (1972).
104 Id. at 185.

10- Id. at 163, 178-79.
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where the primary dependents of the staff member live; °6 and (3)
devaluation, revaluation, and the floating of currencies. 10 7 Though the
federal judiciary is not faced with the problems of fluctuating currencies, the practice of taking into account one's primary dependents is
an aspect of the post-adjustment scheme that may be profitably applied
to the federal judicial salary system.
A. The Benefits of the Proposal
This proposal represents a modest attempt to solve the recurrent
problems of the inadequacy and inequity of judicial salaries. It more
clearly tends to promote the goal of independence of the judicial
branch. By combining these objectives, it seeks to maintain the quality
of the federal judiciary.
Automatic increases without congressional approval or without
recommendations of a public commission or of the President would
make judicial salaries independent of the state of relations between
Congress and the President. By making the salary issue nonnegotiable,
representatives of the judiciary would be less vulnerable in their
dealings with legislative and executive elites and less likely to become
dependent on them.'
Other aspects of the proposal might maintain or improve the quality
of the federal judiciary. The fact that salary will increase commensurately with increases in cost of living should assure prospective
judges that any financial sacrifice which appointment to the federal
bench may entail should not become more severe with the passage of
time. 10 9 Furthermore, making salary increases automatic would eliminate the necessity for substantial lobbying for higher salaries ° and
would help assure the impartiality of judges to the extent that their
political activities are thus minimized. Because the proposal would
decrease the amount of time and other resources that judges and judges'
organizations devote to lobbying, more resources would become available for other concerns of the judiciary.

106 Id.

at 159, 167-68.
101 Id. at 190-95.
108 See note 89 and accompanying text supra.
109 T. John Lesinski, Chief Judge of the Michigan Court of Appeals, who is planning to
resign because of inadequate salary, has recently said that if his salary had been subject to
cost-of-living increases, he would not have decided to resign:
If they had kept it at $32,000 with a normal escalator-like the auto workers
have-to keep up with the rising cost of living, it would have been all right.
Detroit Free Press, Feb. 20, 1975, at IA, col. 2, and 14A, col. I.
110See note 88 and accompanying text supra.
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B. Precedents for the Proposal

A scheme of nonuniform salaries based in part on regional differences in the cost of living is hardly novel. From 1789 to 1891, federal
district judges were paid on a nonuniform basis. In the first judicial
salary scheme there were thirteen judicial districts and six levels of
salary, ranging from $800 to $1,800.111 Increases in the salaries of the
various district judges were enacted sporadically. At any one time,
some districts were included in a given enactment and others were
not." By 1890, the number of judges and judicial districts had increased to fifty-eight, while the number of levels of salary had decreased
to four: $5,000, $4,500, $4,000, and $3,500.1" One reason for this
salary variation was the distance that a judge had to travel." 4 In California for example, the judicial districts were large and the population
was sparse; federal district judges there had to hold court in several
places as well as substitute for circuit judges who were able to travel to
the district only infrequently. Consequently, in 1890, one of the California district judges was the highest paid judge in the country."'
In 1891, the change was made to uniform salaries." 6 The uniform
salary scheme was largely the result of a compromise in the Congress;
paying all the judges a uniform salary would be less expensive than
paying them on a nonuniform basis."' The decision to change was
not made on the principle that uniform payment was a fairer and
more equitable system. 118 In fact, the opposite was assumed." 9
The debate over the Salary Bill 20 in 1891 highlights the major
"I 1 Stat. 72 (1789) included the following salary allocation: District of Delaware, $800;
District of Connecticut, $1,000; District of Kentucky, $1,000; District of Maine, $1,000;
District of New Hampshire, $1,000; District of New Jersey, $1,000; District of Massachusetts, $1,200; District of Georgia, $1,500; District of Maryland, $1,500; District of New
York, $1,500; District of Pennsylvania, $1,600; District of South Carolina, $1,800; District of
Virginia, $1,800.
112 See, e.g., 2.Stat. 121 (1801), "An act to augment the salaries of the district judges in
the districts of Massachusetts, New York, New Jersey, Delaware and Maryland." 2 Stat.
431 (1807) gave the judges of the Mississippi, Indiana, Michigan, and Louisiana Territories
an additional $1,200 each. 2 Stat. 660 (1811) increased only the salary of the judge of the
Circuit Court of the District of Columbia.
,,3 Dickerman, supra note 2, at 86. One judge in California received $5,000. One judge in
New Orleans received $4,500. Eleven judges in Chicago, Baltimore, Boston, Trenton, New
York, Brooklyn, Cincinnati, Utica, Philadelphia, Pittsburgh, and Los Angeles received
$4,000. Forty-five judges received $3,500.
114 22 CONG. REC. 3004 (1891) (report of the House Judiciary Committee);
Dickerman,
supra note 2, at 86.
,,5 Dickerman, supra note 2, at 86 indicates that in 1890 the judge in the District of
California, Judge Hoffman of San Francisco, was the only one paid $5,000.
116 26 Stat. 783 (1891).
117 22 CONG. REC. 3004 (1891).
s11
See notes 121-123 and accompanying text infra.
,19 See note 124 and accompanying text infra.
120 Because the House decided not to consider its own bill, it debated S. 174, 51st Cong.,
1st Sess. (1889), on the House floor. 22 CONG. REC. 3002 (1891).
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motivations of the Congress in changing the compensation system.
The original bill called for nonuniform salaries for federal judges
based explicitly on cost of living variations. 121 This proposal was felt
to be too expensive and was altered on the House floor. 122 Representative Stewart of Vermont, the sponsor of the bill for nonuniform salaries,
admitted that
it has been considered that where any class of Federal officers
are performing precisely the same service and under equal re-.
sponsibility, it is unwise to make a discrimination in respect to
their compensation. As a matter of expediency, inasmuch as this
has become a crying evil, and everybody recognizes the entire
inadequacy of the salaries of these officials in many parts of the
country, and because of the fact ... that all legislation in a coun-

try like ours must of necessity be more or less of a compromise,
or at least to some extent a compromise, it has been considered
wiser for Congress, as a measure of affording relief to the judges
of these courts to fix the salaries on a uniform basis of $5,000.123
But Mr. Stewart was determined to make known his position that the
best long-run scheme involved nonuniformity:
While this salary [$5,000] is ample, no doubt, in some parts of
the country, in some of. the rural regions where the business of
the district courts is not large, in others the salary of $5,000 is
entirely inadequate. Still we believed that it was the best that
could be done now to fix all on a uniform basis of

$5,000.124

In the twentieth century, uniform salaries for federal judges have
become the norm. Subsequent Congresses have ignored the political
expediency leading to the 1891 change and have forgotten the longrange view of Representative Stewart. For example, a House committee in 1926, while considering proposals for judicial salary increases,
included the following comment in its Report:
It is apparent to every person who has considered this subject of
salaries and their inadequacy that it is impossible to make and
pass a bill fixing graduated salaries and paying different compensations to judges of the same class because of geographical or
121 Representative Stewart remarked:

The report of the Judiciary Committee presents a graded bill, making some
changes which were thought by the committee to be justified by the difference
in the expense of living in the different districts.
22 CONG. REC. 3002 (1891).
122The uniform salary bill passed the House on February 21, 1891, 22 CONG. REC. 3087
(1891).
123 22 CONG. REC. 3004 (1891) (remarks of Representative Stewart) (emphasis added).
124 22 CONG. REC. 3005 (1891) (remarks of Representative Stewart).
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other reasons. The mind of the bar association and that of all persons interested in the present bill recognized the fact that a flat
advance is all that can be accomplished. This is justified because
today under the law governing the appointment and assignment of
judges to different localities and districts, judges of our Federal

courts are like a mobile army that can be moved here and there
and assigned to work distances probably from their home district.

All this requires the creation of a flat increase that shall be the
same in every district throughout the United States. 12 5

This argument is not persuasive. If it was possible before 1891 to
ascertain travel costs and differentiate salaries on that basis, it should
be possible to differentiate salaries according to the overall cost of
126
living, given the available data.
V. CONCLUSION

Though this proposal for automatic salary increases based on the
cost of living has some attractive features, it might not be welcomed
by Congress.12 But if the proposal were to be accepted, a two-step
process would be necessary to implement it. First, judicial salaries
would be excluded from the jurisdiction of the Commission on Executive, Legislative, and Judicial Salaries. Second, a new statute would
be enacted embodying the proposals set forth in part IV of this article.
Such an enactment would represent a minor statutory effort to assure
the independence and quality of the judiciary.
-Elliot A. Spoon

H.R. REP. No. 232, 69th Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (1926).
See note 39 and accompanying text supra.
127 One major reason is that Congress has always considered congressional and judicial
salaries together:
By some peculiar legislative alchemy, congressional and judicial salaries are
linked, and when Congress lacks the will to allow itself a pay raise, federal
judges are among those who must suffer.
McGee, supra note 50, at 1259.
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